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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Suppressing Evidence Because The Stop Was
Justified By Reasonable Suspicion, The Arrest Was Justified By Probable
Cause, And The Search Of Garcia’s Person Was Proper Incident To Arrest
A.

The Traffic Stop Was Supported By Reasonable Suspicion Of A Traffic
Infraction
It is undisputed that Garcia crossed over the fog line on a freeway off-

ramp. (R., p. 175; Tr., p. 34, Ls. 6-25.) This provided reasonable suspicion for
Trooper Otto to conduct a traffic stop. State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 298, 32
P.3d 685, 690 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, ___, 362
P.3d 514, 522 (2015) (“We hold that driving onto but not across the line marking
the right edge of the road does not violate Idaho Code section 49-637”
(emphasis added)); id., 362 P.3d at 523-24 (driving on the right white line means
car is no longer being driven “within its lane of travel”) (J. Jones, J., and Kidwell,
J. pro tem, dissenting).

Because crossing over the fog line (as opposed to

merely driving on top of it) creates reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, the
district court erred by concluding the traffic stop was not supported by
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)
Garcia attempts to distinguish Slater and Neal, and the underlying
statutes (I.C. §§ 49-301(1) and 49-637), on the basis that he was on a singlelane off ramp, and there is no law that requires a motorist on a single-lane
highway to maintain that lane.1 (Respondent’s brief, pp. 10-12.) The biggest

Garcia acknowledges (Respondent’s brief, p. 11) that he cannot factually
distinguish Slater, which involved crossing “the fog line on the side of the
highway on-ramp.” Slater, 136 Idaho at 296, 32 P.3d at 688.
1

1

flaw in this argument is Garcia’s false assumption that the off ramp was not part
of I-84, clearly not a single-lane highway. In Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555,
557, 808 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1991), the Court:
conclude[d] that, based upon the definition of “highways” in I.C. §
40–109(5), the runaway escape ramps are, as a matter of law, part
of the highway district road system, being a “roadside
improvements, adjacent lands or interests lawfully acquired,
pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works or fixtures
incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways. ....”
I.C. § 40–109(5).
(Emphasis original.) If runaway escape ramps are part of the highway as a
matter of law, it makes little sense to interpret on and off ramps as not part of the
highway. Because the off ramp was not a separate “highway” from I-84, the
argument that the rules requiring motorists to maintain their lanes of travel did
not apply to it necessarily fails.
A motorist must generally maintain his lane of travel. I.C. §§ 49-301(1),
49-637. Failing to maintain that lane of travel by crossing the fog line creates
reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop. Neal, 159 Idaho at ___, 362 P.3d
at 522; Slater, 136 Idaho at 298, 32 P.3d at 690. Trooper Otto had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Garcia’s vehicle when it crossed the fog line
on the Jerome off ramp of I-84.
B.

The Continued Detention And Ultimate Arrest Of Garcia Was Supported
By Probable Cause And Therefore Proper
After the stop Trooper Otto asked Garcia for his driver’s license. (Tr., p.

39, Ls. 10-12.) Garcia admitted he did not have a driver’s license and produced
as identification only a Mexican consular card. (Tr., p. 15, L. 25 – p. 16, L. 3; p.
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37, L. 2 – p. 38, L. 10.) At that point Trooper Otto had probable cause to arrest
Garcia and search him incident to arrest. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.)
Garcia first argues that the state, in its Appellant’s brief, failed to challenge
the finding that the investigative detention was prolonged, and that the trooper
should have issued a citation ending the detention. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 1314.) This argument fails to comprehend the difference between an investigative
detention based on reasonable suspicion and an arrest based on probable
cause.
An investigative decision based on reasonable suspicion must be limited
in scope in that it must not be “more intrusive or of longer duration than
reasonably necessary to effectuate the investigative detention.”

State v.

Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2000).

An

investigative detention can be rendered a de facto arrest if it is “more intrusive”
than necessary, e.g., State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 901 P.2d 1321 (1995)
(use of handcuffs), or if it is of “longer duration” than reasonably necessary to
confirm or dispel suspicion, e.g., State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 796-97, 964 P.2d
660, 663-64 (1998).

However, if the de facto arrest is justified by probable

cause, the expansion of the stop as to its intrusiveness and duration is
constitutionally reasonable. State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 57, 175 P.3d 216, 219
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); State v.
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991)).
As set forth in more detail in the initial briefing, Trooper Otto had probable
cause to arrest Garcia from the moment Garcia produced a consulate card
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instead of a driver’s license and admitted he did not have a driver’s license.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.) Garcia’s argument that the state failed to address,
and therefore waived, the district court’s determination that the stop had been
expanded, and therefore had become a de facto arrest, is specious. That the
state justified the extended duration by showing that any de facto arrest was
constitutionally proper because based on probable cause squarely addressed,
and refuted, the district court’s opinion that the traffic stop was unreasonably
extended.
Garcia next contends that “Trooper Otto had no probable cause to arrest”
him. (Respondent’s brief, p. 15.) “Probable cause exists when the facts and
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the
offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816,
203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

The

crime of driving without a license is committed by driving “any motor vehicle upon
a highway” without a “current and valid Idaho driver’s license.” I.C. § 49-301(1).
Trooper Otto saw Garcia drive a motor vehicle upon a highway and Garcia
admitted he did not have a current and valid Idaho (or any other) driver’s license.
(Tr., p. 14, L. 10 – p. 15, L. 1; p. 34, L. 6 – p. 37, L. 10; p. 39, Ls. 13-15.) There
is no credible argument that Trooper Otto lacked probable cause to believe
Garcia was driving without a license.
Garcia’s argument is better characterized as contending that Trooper Otto
lacked legal authority to arrest under state statutes. Garcia’s argument hinges
squarely upon the assertion that Trooper Otto was required by I.C. § 49-1407 to

4

cite him for the misdemeanor rather than arrest him. (Respondent’s brief, pp.
13-15.)

To accept such an argument this Court would have to disregard

precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. In Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164, 171-72 (2008), the Court held that probable cause to believe the
defendant committed a crime constitutionally justifies an arrest regardless of
state laws imposing additional limitations or requirements.

Because Trooper

Otto had probable cause to believe Garcia had committed the misdemeanor of
driving without a license, the arrest of Garcia was constitutionally reasonable.
State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 887-888, 354 P.3d 446, 449-450 (2015).
Garcia argues that this Court must disregard controlling Supreme Court
precedent

“[b]ecause

the

state

did

not

raise

that

argument

below.”

2
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 15-16. ) Garcia’s argument fails, however, because the

issue of whether the “stop and search” were constitutionally reasonable was
raised by Garcia in his motion. (R., pp. 69 (motion), 98 (Garcia admits he was

Garcia also argues that he furnished “satisfactory evidence of identity” and the
officer did not have “reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will
disregard a written promise to appear in court” as provided as grounds for arrest
in I.C. § 49-1407(1). (Respondent’s brief, pp. 16-17.) The state’s argument is
before this court (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8) and need not be restated. The state
notes, however, that the claim that the prosecutor “waived” consideration of
whether a Mexican consular card is “satisfactory evidence of identity” is
baseless. The state’s brief filed before the district court clearly stated that a
“Mexican Consular card is not satisfactory evidence of identification.” (R., p.
121.) At oral argument the prosecutor argued that “the defendant did not have
what would appear to be valid identification [so] there’s no way to verify he was
who he says he was.” (Tr., p. 123, L. 21 – p. 124, L. 6.) The record shows that
the application of the statute was raised by the defense and the state did not
concede that the consular card was sufficient identification, especially in light of
evidence that Garcia did not appear on any available data base to confirm the
consular card.
2
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arrested for not having a driver’s license), 104 (Garcia argues lack of a driver’s
license is “not relevant”).) The prosecutor did not have a duty to negate every
legal claim proposed in the motion to suppress, only establish the facts showing
the officer’s actions were reasonable. State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599 n.1,
237 P.3d 1222, 1225 n.1 (Ct. App. 2010) (appellate court not limited in challenge
to ruling on suppression to legal arguments of prosecutor); State v. Bower, 135
Idaho 554, 557-58, 21 P.3d 491, 494-95 (Ct. App. 2001) (state need not
articulate every legal theory justifying search where constitutionality of search is
brought into issue by a defense motion to suppress and countered by
presentation of evidence). Moreover, after concluding that Garcia was “arrested
for Failure to Purchase a Driver’s License,” the district court specifically
determined that the arrest was not valid under I.C. § 49-1407. (R., pp. 159-164.)
Whether the arrest was rendered constitutionally insufficient for failing to follow
state law was thus clearly raised to and decided by the trial court. The trial court
clearly made “an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of
error.” State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999) (quoting
State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993)); see also State v.
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998) (issues actually decided
by trial court are subject to appellate review). Whether the arrest for failure to
purchase a driver’s license was valid and justified the search incident to arrest
was clearly a central issue to the motion to suppress, and actually decided by the
district court. Garcia’s argument—that the appellate court can review the district
court’s holding, but must apply an erroneous legal standard—is without merit.
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The record shows that Trooper Otto had probable cause to believe Garcia
had committed a misdemeanor very early on in the traffic stop, when Garcia
could not produce a driver’s license and admitted he did not have a driver’s
license. That probable cause justified a constitutionally reasonable arrest and a
search of Garcia’s person incident thereto. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762-63 (1969); State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App.
2000). The discovery of drugs on his person, plus other evidence of drug use
and sales, provided grounds to search the car. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho
703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012) (probable cause provides grounds to search
car under automobile exception); State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 118, 266 P.3d
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-353
(2009)) (warrantless search of a car incident to the arrest of an occupant
reasonable “when it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
crime of arrest or when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search”).

The district court employed an

erroneous legal standard and erred when it granted suppression under the facts
of this case.

7

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s
order suppressing evidence and remand this matter for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of February, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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